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IN THE SUPPEME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYAL NORDELL ALLRED, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
MARK E. 
KENNETH 
MOWER, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
COOK, BRYANT MADSEN,) 
R. STRATE and TOM ) 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 15688 
________________________ ) 
REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff replies to the arguments propounded by Defendants 
in their briefs as follows: 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS IN THEIR POINT I HAVE ~TTEMPTED TO 
IHPOSE ON THE COURT AN OLD AND MINORITY DIS-
TINCTION BETWEEN SLANDER PER SE AND SLANDER 
PER QUOD WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR INI-
TIAL MEMORANDA TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
In their Memoranda to the trial court, the Defendants Cook 
and Madsen each asserted the definitions of slander contained 
in the ~estatement of Torts Sections 570-574 (R21 & 22 and 
R40). Strate asserted the definitions in 50 Am.Jur.2d (R48 & 49). 
Plaintiff agrees with those publications and relied on them as 
well (Plaintiff's Brief P.8). 
In their Brief on appeal, however, Defendants have resorted 
to the case of Ramsey v. Zeigner, 444 P.2d 968 (N.M. 1968) and 
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Paris v. Division of State Compensation Fund, 517 P.2d 1353 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1973) to make the point that if inference 
or innuendo is required to render the words in question mis-
chievious they are not actionable Per Se but only actionable 
Per Quod. 
Restatement of Torts, Second Edition, acknowledges that 
some courts have taken the position now asserted by Defen-
dants; characterized it as a minority position; observed its 
lack of currency and pointed out the reason for the change 
as follows(comment to §569 at mid-page 183): 
Some courts have taken the position that a 
libelous publication is actionable per se only 
if its defamatory meaning is apparent on its 
face and without reference to extrinsic facts; 
otherwise proof of harm is required. The princi-
pal justification urged for this minority posi-
tion -- that if the defendant did not himself 
knO'-' of the extrinsic facts he would be held 
liable without fault -- has now been elimina-
ted by the current constitutional rule that 
the plaintiff must show fault on the part of 
the defendant regarding the defamatory character 
of the communication. 
The Ramsev v. Zeigner decision most relied on by Defendants 
in their Brief (quoted in two places in support of essentially 
the same argument), while it recites the rule advocated by 
Defendants, held the language in question to be libelous 
Per Se apparently against the contention made here that it was 
not libelous without resort to extrinsic facts. More importantt 
however, the New Mexico Court has since overruled that case 
and adopted the Restatement position in a carefully analyzed 
decision in Reed v. Melnick, 81 NM 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970). 
-2-
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The court there observed at both second column P. 180: 
Thus we adopt §569 of the Restatement 
of Torts, together with what we under-
stand to be the intended meaning of the 
amendment adopted at the 1966 meetinq 
of the American Law Institute. -
and further first column P. 181: 
Our previous holdings contrary to the 
above are modified accordingly -- We 
limit the statement of the "per se--
per quod" rule in Ramsey v. Zeigner and 
question its use by - - - etc. 
It should be noted that both cases cited by Defendants 
in their Brief, Zeigner and Paris v. State Compensation Fund, 
the overruling Reid v. Melnick case and the Restatement of 
Torts §569, all involve defamation cases and definitlons. 
That the same rule applies to slander is clear from the 
Restatement §570 and 573 as follows: 
§570. Liability Without Proof of Special Harm- Slander 
One who publishes matter defamatory to another 
in such a manner as to make the publication a 
slander is subject to liability to the other 
although no special harm results if the publi-
cation imputes to the other 
(a) a criminal offense, as stated in §571, or 
(b) a loathsome disease, as stated in §572, or 
(c) matter incompatible with his business, 
trade, profession, or office, as stated in §573,or 
(d) serious sexual misconduct, as stated in §574. 
§573 Slanderous Imputations Affecting Business, 
Trade, Profession or Office 
One who publishes a slander that ascribes to 
another conduct, characteristics or a condition 
-3-
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that would adversely affect his fitness 
for the proper conduct of his lawful busi-
ness, trade or profession, or of his public 
or private office, whether honorary or for 
profit, is subject to liability without proof 
of special harm. 
Note 570's heading is Liability Without Proof of Special 
Harm -- the essential distinction between Per Se and Per Quod 
and 573 says "is subject to liability without proof of special 
harm" -- also the essential distinction between Per Se and 
Per Quod (see definitions Libelous Per Se and Libelous Per Quod 
P.l062 Black's Law Dictionary 4th ed.) 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE. 
THEY DID NOT SATISFY THE CONDITIONS OF THEIR 
CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE. 
As to the law on this subject, generally Plaintiff cites 
the Annotati::m entitled "Actionability of Statements Imputing 
Inefficiency or Lack of Qualification To Public School Teacher 
40 ALR 3d 490, "(the .",nnotation includes cases involving I 
I 
Teache~'l principals and superintendants as part of "Public School 
The general rule is cited at P.493 as follows: 
Generally, accusations or statements, written 
or oral, imputing to a school teacher want of 
professional capacity are actionable per se. 
The general rule as to school officials is stated at P.502: 
A qualified or conditional privilege for school 
officials or administrators to make statements 
imputing inefficiency or lack of qualification 
to a public school teacher has been recognized 
irt the following cases. 
That Annotation introduces the issue of absolute privileae 
-4-
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as follows at P. 506: 
§ 5. Absolute Privilege 
The few cases where the issue of absolute 
privilege was raised in regard to state-
ments imputing inefficiency or lack of 
qualification to a public school teacher 
have involved statements made by school 
officials or administrators. Some courts 
have held that such statements were abso-
lutely privileged. 
Clearly the Annotators regard the absolute privilege 
doctrine as a minority or spurious vie\-1. 
Defendants' cite the Utah case of Carter v. Jackson, 
351 P2d 957, 10 Ut.2d 282 in support of their claim that 
in this case there was an absolute privilege, but that case 
relies on a Utah Statute saying that matter is not libelous 
Per Se when made in the proper discharge of an official duty 
or in any publication of any statement made in any legisla-
tive or judicial proceeding. Plaintiff urges that his Complaint 
alleges and he believes he can prove that Defendants made the 
statements in question: 
(a) in the parked car (Complaint paragraph 3, R-2). 
(b) to many persons (Complaint paragraph 4 R-3). 
(c) to an informal meeting of citizens of Spring City 
(Complaint paragraph 5 R-6). 
(d) and told many persons privately (Complaint paragraph 
6 R-3). 
Plaintiff concedes that if the statements were made in the 
proper discharge of Defendants' duties and were made in good 
faith without malice, they were privileged, but urges that the 
-5-
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statements herein complained of were not made in or as part of 
Defendants' official duties -- they were in fact made because 
Defendants could not accomplish what they wanted in the course 
of their official duties; they were not made in good faith and 
were made with malice. In short, they were not privileged. 
Defendants' complain that Plaintiff did not allege that the 
statements made by Defendants were not made in an official ca-
pacity nor in official proceedings. Plaintiff contends that if 
Defendants believe those matters to be true, they are matters 
of defense and should be pleaded and proved by Defendants as 
part of their defense. Plaintiff's Complaint can not reasonably 
I 
plead the absence or negative of all possible defenses, especial!: I 
defenses that Plaintiff believes are not applicable. 
Plaintiff concedes that Defendants had a conditional privi-
lege to make statements they believed or had reason to believe 
were true in the course of their official duties. Had they set. 
out to dismiss Plaintiff in accordance with the law they could 
' have reported to the Board what they considered to be his de-
ficiencies. But they can not tell numerous persons unrelated 
to their official duties what they knew to be untruths and 
said to be either in the course of their duties or in good 
be 
. h I fa1 t . I 
Fifty Am.Jur.2d on "Libel and Slander- School Matters," §205 
p.713 says: 
Because of the great public interest involved, 
it is generally recognized that statements in 
regard to school matters are qualifiedly privi-
leged if made by persons having a common duty or 
interest in the premises and acting in good faith. 
-6-
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-- It must be borne in mind that the privilege 
referred to is only qualified, and affords no 
protection against an improper or excessive pub-
lication, or a publication from malicious motives. 
Thus, assuming that the parent of a schoolchild 
is privileged to repeat to a member of the board of 
education a report that a teacher was afflicted 
with a contagious disease, it is clear that he 
can claim no privilege in respect of further 
repetitions to third persons. 
Plaintiff's pleadings concerning Defendants' efforts and 
desire to remove him from his job in the context of their 
inability to accomplish that result in a lawful way and their 
efforts to accomplish that same thing by untruths indicate 
their malice and further removes them from a conditional privi-
lege. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT IMMUNE. 
On this point1 Defendants' Brief contends or assumes 
(especially P. 28) 
(a) Defendants acted without malice. 
(b) Defendants acted in good faith. 
(c) Defendants acted in the course of their official capaci-
ties. 
Plaintiff concedes if all those matters were true Defendants 
are not liable. Plaintiff has contended in its original Brief 
that neither of those matters are true and will rest on that 
except to make the observation that each of those matters in-
valves a question of fact that Plaintiff contends he is en-
entitled to have a jury decide. Plaintiff further observes that 
-7-
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each of said matters is to some extent a matter of defense 
which Defendants are required to plead and prove. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT PROPOSE TO INFRINGE TOM 
MOWER'S CIVIL RIGHTS. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MOWER IS MADE BY THE 
SEVERAL TIMES REPEATED PHRASE "DEFENDANTS 
AND EACH OF THEM" BY WHICH PLAINTIFF INTEND-
ED TO INCLUDE THE DEFENDANT MOWER. 
Paragraphs 2, 4, 6 and 7 each contain the phrase "Defen-
dants and each of them." As to each of those paragraphs, 
Plaintiff claims against the Defendant Mower as well as the 
other Defendants. 
Plaintiff does not contend that the Defendant Mower was or 
is or in any way should be inhibited from using his politi-
cal clout for the purpose of removing Plaintiff from his job 
as superintendant. Plaintiff does claim that the Defendant 
Mower is not entitled to employ untruths to do so and that 
to the extent he has he is liable for slander. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As a matter of reply, Defendants' Memoranda do not change 
the position urged by Plaintiff in its original Brief. Accord-
ingly, Plaintiff reasserts the Summary asserted therein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of December, 1978. 
" l,__~ ( //7~~ 
Gerald E. Nielson 
1795 West 2300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
-8-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed copies of Plaintiff's 
Reply Brief to Allan L. Larson, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
Robert C. Fillerup, HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, 120 East 300 
North Street, Provo, Utah 84601, Robert L. Moody, CHRISTENSEN, 
TAYLOR & MOODY, 55 East Center Street Provo, Utah 84601, and 
Don R. Strong, 197 South Main Street, Springville, Utah 84663, 
postage prepaid, this 8th day of December, 1978. 
I ·/' \ / { 
·f--.~~ 
/ / 
! -- ~ I_J" ___ ..__ 
Gerald E. Nielson 
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